In April of this year, the Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated decision, resolving a circuit split and clarifying the level of harm required to prove a Title VII discrimination claim. It is well established that to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim, an employee must plead and prove some harm related to the terms and conditions of their employment that resulted from the discriminatory conduct. This is what courts have referred to as “adverse employment action.” However, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, courts disagreed on the level or degree of harm required to satisfy this element. Some circuit courts of appeals, including the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits, required Title VII plaintiffs to provide proof of “materially significant disadvantage” (i.e., diminution to title, salary, or benefits) in a discrimination suit. In its April 2024 decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and overruled the Eighth Circuit’s holding that Muldrow was required to show “significant” or “material” harm, thus resolving the circuit split on the threshold and nature of harm required for an employment action to be considered discriminatory under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Petitioner Sgt. Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer for the St. Louis Police Department for nine years in its specialized Intelligence Division. During this time, she showed strong performance, worked with high-ranking officials, and had a consistent weekday schedule, along with access to FBI credentials, an unmarked take-home vehicle, and the authority to pursue investigations outside of St. Louis. In 2017, the Intelligence Division commander transferred Muldrow out of the unit and into a uniformed position and replaced her with a male officer. Though her rank and pay remained the same in her new role, her perks, scheduling, responsibilities, status, and professional relationships did not.
Muldrow sued the City of St. Louis under Title VII, claiming that the transfer was a discriminatory employment action. The District Court held, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, that Muldrow was required and had failed to show “significant” change in her working conditions, because the transfer caused only minor changes that did not reduce her title, salary, or benefits. The case made it to the Supreme Court, which ultimately vacated the lower courts’ judgment, holding that a job transfer can be deemed discriminatory even if the employee’s pay and title remain the same, and that a loss of perks, change of duties, and transfer to a position of less favorable status are enough to demonstrate the level of harm required for a discriminatory employment action. The Court found that the language of Title VII only required Muldrow to show that the transfer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an identifiable term or condition of her employment based on her protected characteristic(s), and that Muldrow was not required to show an elevated threshold of harm or that the injury incurred satisfied a “significance” test, as “Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar,” and requiring such would demand more of Title VII plaintiffs than the law as written requires. Accordingly, while Muldrow represents a victory for Title VII claimants, it also represents another victory for the principles of textualism in statutory interpretation, whereby courts must interpret and apply a statute’s express and plain language and may not add limitations or additional proof requirements not contained within the text.
When making employment decisions, employers should remember that keeping an employee’s title/rank the same and/or maintaining their salary at the same level, while making other changes to their role, compensation opportunities, or benefits, will not be enough alone to stave off a discrimination claim. All changes will need to be considered. In addition to Title VII discrimination claims, the Muldrow standard of harm could also apply to discrimination claims in the context of ADA accommodation discrimination and failure to accommodate claims.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our firm.
Special Thanks to Legal Intern, Alexandra Carmack
